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Gorbin

What I post are direct pieces of evidence from scholarly articles that support my position-only read the bold taglines, and the bold, underlined sentences. These are the most important pieces of evidence, and they are what you should be reading, along with the author name in the citation above the piece of evidence.

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University policies for equality substitute action for a good view of the organization. The institutions marking that issues are “fixed” halt the need and ability for outside advocates to create change and mask inequality

Ahmed 3 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Chapter 44: Trying to Transform”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 104-107 //Accessed 3/22/2017 GK+KE)

 Many practitioners and academics have expressed concerns that writing documents or policies becomes a substitute for action: as one of my interviewees puts it, “You need up doing the document rather than doing the doing.” Documents become all diversity workers have time to do. Documents then circulate within organizations, often referring to each other, creating a family of documents. They create a paper trail, a trace of where they have been. In some sense the point of the document is to leave a trail. Diversity work: a paper trail. The very orientation toward writing good documents can block action, insofar as the document then gets taken up as evidence that we have “done it.” As another practitioner describes, “Well I think in terms of the policies, people’s views are, ‘Well we’ve got them now so that’s done. It’s finished.’ I think actually, I’m not sure if that’s even worse than having nothing, that idea in people’s heads that we’ve done race, when we very clearly haven’t done race.” The idea that the document is doing something is what could allow the institution to block recognition of the work that there is to do. The idea that the document does race means that people can think that race has been done when it has not. The idea that we are doing race is thus how we are not doing race. One of the consequences of equality becoming embedded in audit culture is that equality itself becomes a good performance of the organization, or a way the organization can perform well. When an equality policy is ranked as good, this rank is taken up as a sign of equality, which is how signs of inequality disappear from view. Equality and diversity are used as performance indicators to present the best view of the organization. Diversity is thus increasingly exercised as a form of public relations: “The planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain good will and understanding between an organization and its publics.”2 In an interview I had with staff from a human resources department, we discussed a research project that was collecting what is called in the qualities sector “perception data,” that is, data about how external publics perceive an organization. This project was funded as part of the university’s equality policy. What did they find? Okay, yes. It was about uncovering perceptions about the [university] as an employer…. [The university] was considered to be an old boys’ network, as they called it, and white male dominated, and they didn’t have the right perceptions of the [university] in terms of what it offers and what it brings to the academia. I think most of the external people had the wrong perceptions about the [university]. This is another way that diversity involves image management: diversity work becomes about generating the right image for the organization by correcting the wrong one. Here the perception of the institution as white is treated as wrong; to make the perception right you change the image. Diversity becomes about changing perceptions of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of organizations. And we can see a key difficulty here: even if diversity is an attempt to transform the institution, it too can be a technique for keeping things in place. The very appearance of a transformation (a new, more colorful face for the organization) is what stops something from happening. A new policy can be agreed upon without anything changing. A new policy can be agreed upon as a way of not changing anything. Another practitioner spoke to me about what appeared to be an institutional success story: a decision was made and agreed upon by the university’s equality and diversity committee that all internal members of appointment panels for academics should have had diversity training. This decision could be described as good practice. IT was made properly but the committee that was authorized to make the decision (the equality and diversity committee), which included members of the Senior Management Team (SMT). The minutes were then sent for approval to council, which alone had authority to make the recommendation into policy: When I was first here, there was a policy that you had to have three people on every panel who had been trained. But then there was a decision early on where I was here that it should be everybody, all panel members, at least internal people. They took that decision at the equality and diversity committee, which several members of SMT were present at. But then the director of human resources found out about it and decided we didn’t have enough resources to support it, and it went to council with that taken out and council were told that they were happy to have just three members, only a person on council who was an external member of the diversity committee went ballistic - and I am not kidding, went ballistic - and said the minutes didn’t reflect what had happened (and I didn’t take the minutes, by the way). And so they had to take it through and reverse it. And the council decision was that all people should be trained. And despite that, I have then sat in meetings where they just continued saying that it has to be just three people on the panel. And I said, but no, council changed their view and I can give you the minutes, and they just look at me as if I am saying something really . This went on for ages, even though the council minutes definitely said all panel members should be trained. And to be honest, sometimes you just give up. It seems as if there is an institutional decision. Individuals within the institution must act as if the decision has been made for it to be made. If they do not, it has not. A decision made in the present about the future (under the promissory sign “we will”) can be overridden by the momentum of the past. The past becomes like the crowd discussed in part 1: a momentum becomes not only a direction, but a directive. A command does not have to be given to ensure things go that way, and indeed a command would not stop things from going that way. Perhaps a yes can be said because the weight of the past will not allow that yes to acquire the force needed to bring something into effect. I have called this mechanism non-performativity: when naming something does not bring something into effect or (more strongly) when something is named in order not to bring something into effect. When yes does not bring something into effect, that yes conceals this not bringing under the appearance of having brought. A yes might even be more utterable when it has less force; or a yes might be uttered by being emptied of force. In other words, it might be easier for an institution within an institution to say yes because there is nothing behind that yes. I return to this example in chapter 6 because it has so much to teach us about institutional walls. 

The hegemonic order of supremacy in the university thrives on what bodies can articulate. Marginalized bodies lose their vocational power as the complicit nature of universities’ discourse uphold systems of arbitrary exclusion.

Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American & Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 186-187, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629)

The theory of articulation provides us with the means of critiquing language, discourse, and power. The theory of articulation is inextricably linked with and wedded to hegemony. As Asante (1998) noted, Speech is itself a political act... Whenever one categorizes society in an effort to make concepts functional, one makes a choice among possibilities. Making a choice among possibilities creates cleavages that benefit some to the disadvantage of others. Through a choice in language and action, maintenance of the current white supremacist hegemonic order becomes “intertwined in the most intricate patterns of our conversation and language.” (p.87788) The enactment of agency with regard to language choice and action becomes a subjective choice to maintain the status quo or use language that produces actions that challenge the current hegemonic order. The reproduction of hegemony is itself not solely a problem of color, but also a historical conceptual framework based on values granted to particular racial categories (Asante, 1998) and values granted to particular language and action choices. Therefore, while White supremacy may be a function of the institutional structure, it maintains its naturalization because individuals through their articulation and enactment of hegemony perpetuate marginalization. This enactment of hegemony can take the form of “the dissemination of symbols and acts of speech itself” (p.89). In other words, a conception of so-called reality takes place within the institution whether it is through action, language, or thought. Therefore, an institutionalized social framework becomes naturalized, reified, and unquestioned. As Slack (1997) explained, Epistemologically, articulation is a way of thinking the structures of what we know as a play of correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in the constitution of what we take to be unities. Politically, articulation is a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power that entail in relations of dominance and subordination. Strategically, articulation provides a mechanism for shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context. (p.112) The theory of articulation requires an examination of the configuration of power in any social condition and through which people or institutions “advance or defend their interests and devise tactics and strategies appropriate to their aims” (Fiske,1996, p. 67). In other words, people must examine the complicitousness through which they defend their action and language choices. Language is intertwined with articulation because socially constructed knowledge, language, and action shape the present situation and the status quo, which, in turn, have the power to shape the individual and the institution and to reinforce the hegemonic order (Hall, 1997). In higher education, as W. R. Allen (1992) argued, there are numerous barriers that, collectively, ensure that “a status quo rooted in an unfair system of racial stratification is reproduced within the university” (p.42). Among these barriers are culturally and economically biased standardized tests, administration and faculty that is largely White men, high tuition costs and low financial aid programs, an emphasis on competition, and little cultural pluralism and diversity. W. R. Allen stated that the "nation’s colleges and universities seem to be not only content with, but committed to, the current system of structured inequality, a system in which African Americans [and other ethnic minorities] suffer grievously" (p. 42). Change in higher education and in pedagogy, W.R. Allen noted, will only come when universities feel more responsibility to change and challenge the current status quo: If we fail to respond creatively and effectively to this challenge, not only will history judge us harshly, but this country will also continue to suffer the negative consequences, such as the loss of its competitive edge in the world market, that have resulted from its failure to develop fully and utilize the talents of all its people, without regard to race, gender, or class.(p.43) Whether intentionally or not, universities can signal their collusion with maintaining the White supremacist hegemonic order even as it articulates itself as "open" and is often polemically known as "liberal" because of complicitous language and actions that on the surface appear to address hegemony, however, on closer inspection, they ultimately maintain it (Patton, 2004). Dziech and Hawkins (1998) believed that "whether it is an extension of or a reaction against its history, an institution’s present always reflects its past, and that past influences[marginalized bodies] profoundly” (p.560).To challenge hegemonic concerns, academia must be ever-evolving. Discourses are ways of constituting knowledge or "truth." Through discourse people make meaning and make sense of their everyday world. As people communicate about their social world they create and construct "truths." According to Deetz and Mumby (1990), this process of communicating necessarily takes place in the context of power relations. As these scholars showed, communication and how it is structured can reify and restructure hegemony. In their view, "communication can be said to function ideologically in that it produces and reproduces (i.e., legitimates) a particular structure of power relations (i.e., systems of interests) to the arbitrary exclusion of other possible configurations of interests" (p.42).Thus a constant power struggle ensues because communication occurs in the context of hegemonic relations.

These actions maintain hegemony and become a depletion of will for the Other. White patriarchy relies on this promise of happiness. Oppression becomes happiness with circulated images of the happy woman in the kitchen, the thankful woman with lower pay and the happy slave. Happiness requires that the Other renounce desire and will to become complacent with death.

Ahmed 4 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism. Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke U Press, 2010. Pg. 63-64 //DOA 1/29/17 KE)

It is Sophy’s imagination that threatens to get in the way of her happiness, and thus of the happiness of all. Imagination is what allows girls to question the wisdom they have received and to ask whether what is good for all is necessarily good for them. We could describe one episode of The MiU on the Fhss¶ as Maggie becoming Sophy (or becoming the Sophy that Sophy must be in¶ order to fulfil her narrative function). Maggie has an epiphany: the answer¶ to her troubles is to become happy and good: “ it flashed through her like the¶ suddenly apprehended solution of a problem, that all the miseries of her young¶ life had come from fixing her heart on her own pleasure as if that were the¶ central necessity of the universe" (306). From the point of view of the parents,¶ their daughter has become good because she has submitted to their will:¶ “Her mother felt the change in her with a sort of puzzled wonder that Maggie¶ should be ‘growing up so good'; it was amazing that this once ‘contrairy’ child¶ was becoming so submissive, so backward to assert her own will" (309). To be good as a girl is to give up having a will of one’s own. The mother can thus love the daughter who is becoming like furniture, who can support the family by staying in the background: “The mother was getting fond of her tall, brown¶ girl, the only bit of furniture now in which she could bestow her anxiety and¶ pride” (309). It is as if Maggie has chosen between happiness and life, by giving up life for¶ happiness: ‘“I’ve been a great deal happier,’ she said at last timidly, ‘since I have¶ given up thinking about what is easy and pleasant, and being discontented because¶ I couldn’t have my own will. Our life is determined for us — and it makes the mind very free when we give up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us and doing what is given us to do’” (317). Happiness is associated here with the renunciation of desire.^ It is her friend Philip whom Maggie is¶ addressing at this point. It is Philip who loves Maggie for her aliveness, who gives her books that rekindle her sense of interest and curiosity about the world. He gives her one book that she cannot finish as she reads in this book the injustice of happiness, which is given to some and not others, those deemed worthy of love. “‘I didn’t finish the book,’ said Maggie. ‘As soon as I came to the blond-haired young girl reading in the park, I shut it up and determined to read no further, I foresaw that that light-complexioned girl would win away all the love from Corinne and make her miserable. I’m determined to read no more books where the blondhaired women carry away all the happiness. I should begin to have a prejudice against them. If you could give me some story, now, where the dark woman triumphs, it would restore the balance. I want to avenge Rebecca, and Flora Maclvor, and Minna, and all the rest of the dark unhappy ones’” (348-45). Exercising a racialized vocabulary, Maggie exposes how darkness becomes a form of unhappiness, as lacking the qualities deemed necessary for being given a happy ending.*^ Maggie gives up on giving up her life for happiness by speaking out against the injustice of happiness and how it is given to some and not others. The novel relies on contrasting the cousins Lucy and Maggie in terms of their capacity to be happy and dutiful. Maggie admits her unhappiness to Lucy: “One gets a bad habit of being unhappy” (389). For Lucy, being happy is a way of not being trouble; she cannot live with the reality of getting into trouble: as she says, “I’ve always been happy, I don’t know whether I could bear much trouble” (389). Happiness involves a way of avoiding what one cannot bear. The climactic moment of the novel comes when Stephen, who is betrothed to Lucy, announces his desire for Maggie, who is swept away by it. She almost goes along with him but realizes that she cannot: “Many things are difficult and dark to me, but I see one thing quite clearly: that I must not, cannot, seek my own happiness by sacrificing others” (471). Maggie chooses duty as if without duty there would be only the inclination of the moment. As a good Kantian subject, she says: “If the past is not to bind us, where can duty he? We should have no law but the inclination of the moment” (499), to which Stephen replies, “But it weighs nothing with you that you are robbing me of my happiness” (500-501).*'* By choosing duty, Maggie does not avoid causing unhappiness. She must pay for her moment of transgression. Having deviated from the path of happiness, she has fulfilled her destiny as trouble. As she says in one letter: “Oh God, is there any happiness in love that could make me forget their pain” (528). Death as a result of a natural disaster (a flood) thus liberates Maggie from the unhappy consequences of causing trouble, of deviating from the paths of happiness. The injustice of her loss of life is how the novel speaks against happiness, which itself is narrated as the renunciation of life, imagination, and desire. Even if books like The Mill on the Floss seem to punish their heroines for their transgressions, they also evoke the injustice of happiness, showing what and whom happiness gives up. In giving up on those who seem to give up on happiness, happiness acquires its coherence. We could describe happiness quite simply as a convention, such that to deviate from the paths of happiness is to challenge convention. What is a convention? The word convention comes from the verb “to convene.” To convene is to gather, to assemble, or to meet up, A convention is a point around which we gather. To follow a convention is to gather in the right way, to be assembled. Feminism gives time and space to women’s desires that are not assembled around the reproduction of the family form. Feminists must thus be willing to cause disturbance. Feminists might even have to be willful. A subject would be described as willful at the point that her will does not coincide with that of others, those whose will is reified as the general or social will.*

Violence against the Other is upheld with questions “Why do you want so much? Why aren’t you just happy?” Thus, the project of feminism is to acquire the voice and will that uses speech to mark and make violence visible

Ahmed 5 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Chapter 3: Willfulness and Feminist Subjectivity”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 72-73 //Accessed 2/9/2017 GKKE)

I think of this embodied history as my own history of willfulness. And that too is a challenge to the discourse of stranger danger, which assumes that violence originates outside of home. Stranger danger could be used to retell this story as the story of the violence of the Muslim father. Here the story becomes complicated: it is a feminist of color kind of complication. When we speak of violence directed against us, we know how quickly that violence can be racialized; how racism will explain that violence as an expression of culture, which is how racism and religion become entangled. Violence would the again be assumed to originate with outsiders. Some forms of violence become cultural, and other forms of violence remain individual and idiosyncratic: the some of this distinction is racism. I return to the racism at stake in the potential reframing of my own story in chapter 7. We must still tell these stories of violence because of how quickly that violence is concealed and reproduced. We must always tell them with care. But it is risky: when they are taken out of hands they can become another form of beating. Willfulness comes up in part as a mechanism for justifying violence by those who are violent. And why I mention this here, this very ordinary experience of violence directed against girls and women by fathers or husbands within the supposed safety of home (that this is ordinary is why we must mention it) is that my own father’s blows were always accompanied by words. He would ask insistently punishing questions: why do you want so much? Why are you never satisfied? Why do you not do better at school? In other words, being judged as willful was a technique for justifying violence in the midst of violence. You are being punished for your subjectivity, for being the being you are. You can be beaten by a judgement. And then: you become the cause of the violence directed against you. I did work out what to do, and found my own ways of stopping it. I began to scream really loudly when he went for me. He would stop very quickly after I screamed. Why did this work? So often people do not recognize their actions as violent; we know this. Hitting a willful girl, after all, has been justified as discipline and moral instruction: for her own good. By screaming, I announced my father’s violence. I made it audible. And I learned from this too: becoming a feminist was about becoming audible, feminism as screaming in order to be heard; screaming as making violence visible; feminism as acquiring a voice. 

Thus I affirm the resolution. The 1AC is a standing resistance against institutionalized happiness in university settings through the figure of the killjoy.

The 1AC is a personal killjoy manifesto against the oppressive structures of happiness in academic spaces. Sharing of experiences is an assertion of our will against violence. Joy is found in our killing of happiness. To be a killjoy is to be a political activist.

Ahmed 6 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Conclusion II”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 254-257 //Accessed 2/9/2017 GKKE)

We must stay unhappy with this world. The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, some of which 1 discusses in chapter I (see also Ahmed 2010). Happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods. As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely, "It is always easy to describe a, happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others] (1949] 1997, 28). Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. A killjoy becomes a manifesto when we are willing to take up this figure, to assemble a life not as her (I discussed the risks of assuming we are her in chapter 7) but around her, in her company. We are willing to killjoy because the world that assigns this or that person or group of people as the killjoys is not to world a want to be part of. To be willing to killjoy is to transform a judgment into a project. A manifesto: how a judgment becomes a project. To think of killjoys as manifestos is to say that a politics of transformation, a politics that intends to cause the end of a system, is not a program of action that can be separates from how we are in the worlds we are in. Feminism is praxis. We enact the world we are aiming for; nothing Iess will do. Lesbian feminism, as I noted in chapter 9, is how we organize our lives in such a way that our relations to each other as women are not mediated through our relations to men. A life becomes an archive of rebellion, this is why a killjoy manifesto will be personal. Each of us killjoys will have our own. My manifesto does not suspend my personal story it is how that story unfolds into action. It is from difficult experiences, or being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we gain the energy to rebel It is from what we conic up against that we gain new angles on what we are against. Our bodies become our tools; our rage becomes sickness. We vomit; we vomit out what we have been asked to take in. Our guts become our feminist friends the more we are sickened. We begin to feel the weight of histories more and more; the more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. We snap under the weight; things break. A manifesto is written out of feminist snap. A manifesto is feminist snap. And: we witness as feminists the trouble feminism causes. I would hazard a guess; feminist trouble is an extension of gender trouble (Butler 1990). To be more specific: feminist trouble is the trouble with women. When we refuse to be women, in the heteropatriarchal sense as beings for men, we become trouble, we get into trouble. A killjoy is willing to get into trouble. And this I think is what is specific about a killjoy manifesto: that we bring into our statements of intent or purpose the experience of what we come up against. It is this experience that allows us to articulate a for, a for that carries with it an experience of what we come up against. A for can be how we turn Something about a manifesto is about what it aims to bring about. There is no doubt in my mind that a feminist killjoy is for something; although as killjoys we are not necessarily for the same things. But you would only be willing to live with the consequences of being against what you come up against if you are for something, A life can be a manifesto. When I read some of the books in my survival kit, I hear them as manifestos, as calls to action; as calls to arms. They are books that tremble with life because they show how a life can be rewritten; how we can rewrite a life, letter by letter. A manifesto has a life, a life of its own; a manifesto is an outstretched hand. And if a manifesto is a political action, it depends on how it is received by others. And perhaps a hand can do more when it is not simply received by another hand, when a gesture exceeds the firmness of a handshake. Perhaps more than a hand needs to shake, If a killjoy manifesto is a handle, it flies out of hand. A manifesto thus repeats something that has already happened' as we know the killjoy has flown off. Perhaps a killjoy manifesto is unhandy; a feminist flight. When we refuse to be the master’s tool, we expose the violence of rods, the violences that built the master's dwelling, brick by brick. When we make violence manifest, a violence that is reproduced by not being made a manifesto, we will be assigned as killjoys. It is because of what she reveals that a killjoy he - comes a killjoy in the first place. A manifesto is in some sense behind her. This is not to say that writing a killjoy manifesto is not also a commitment; that it is not also an idea if how to move forward. A killjoy has her principles. A killjoy manifesto shows how we create principles from an experience of what we come up against, from how we live a feminist life. When I say principles here, I do not mean rules of conduct that we must agree to in order to proceed in a common direction. I might say that a feminist life is principled but feminism often becomes an announcement at the very moment of the refusal to be bound by principle. When I think of feminist principles, I think of principles in the original sense: principle as a first step, as a commencement, a start of something. A principle can also be what is elemental to a craft. Feminist killjoys and other willful subjects are crafty; we are becoming crafty. There are principles in what we craft. How we begin does not determine where we end up„ but principles do give shape or direction. Feminist principles are articulated in unfeminist worlds. Living a life with feminist principles is thus not living smoothly; we bump into the world that does not live in accordance with the principles we try to live. For some reason, the principles I articulate here ended up being expressed as statements of will; of what a killjoy is willing (to do or to be) or not willing (to do or to be). I think we can understand the some of this reason. A killjoy manifesto is a willful subject; she wills wrongly by what she is willing or is not willing to do. No wonder a willful subject has principles; she can be principled. She can share them if you can bear them. 

Thus the killjoy is the praxis point to resolve other violent power structures – our project of phenomenology expose the origin of violence and call to action rage against violent structures of happiness. 

The role of the ballot is vote for the debater that best opens up spaces for us oppressed bodies to assert our will. Every reading of the 1AC exposes a new moment of happiness in every rfd, decision, and refutation that must be sabotaged for liberation

Ahmed 7 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism. Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke U Press, 2010. Pg. 19-20//DOA 1/29/17 KE)

Every writer is first a reader, and what we read matters. I think of myself primarily as a reader of feminist, queer, and antiracist books — these books form the intellectual and political horizon of this book. I would describe these books as my philosophy books in the sense that they are the books that have helped me to think about how happiness participates in the creation of social form. But my archive does not just include books or films. If you follow the word happiness you end up everywhere! So my archive is also my world, my life-world, my past as well as present, where the word happiness has echoed so powerfully. One of the speech acts that always fascinated me is “I just want you to be happy,” which I remember being said to me an awful lot when I was growing up. Writing this book has given me a chance to wonder more about what it means to express “just want” for the happiness of another. But this is just one kind of happiness speech act. There are many! Others you will encounter in this book include “I’m happy if you are happy,” “I cannot bear you to be un­ happy,” “I want to make you happy,” “I want to see you being happy,” and “I want to be the cause of the happiness that is inside you.” How often we speak of happiness! If my task is to follow the words, then I aim to describe what kind of world takes shape when it is given that the happiness of which we speak is good. The question “what does happiness do?” is inseparable from the question of how happiness and unhappiness are distributed over time and in space. To track the history of happiness is to track the history of its distribution. Happiness gets distributed in all sorts of complicated ways. Certainly to be a good subject is to be perceived as a happiness-cause, as making others happy. To be bad is thus to be a killjoy. This book is an attempt to give the killjoy back her voice and to speak from recognition of how it feels to inhabit that place. I thus draw on my own experiences of being called a killjoy in describing the sociability of happiness. So many of the discussions I have had about this research have involved “swapping killjoy stories.” I remember one time at a conference table when we were discussing being killjoys at the family table. The conference was organized by the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association in 2007, and it was the first time I had been to a conference in Australia as a person of color from Australia where I felt at home. I now think of spaces created by such conferences as providing new kinds of tables, perhaps tables that give support to those who are unseated by the tables of happiness. I know that I risk overemphasizing the problems with happiness by presenting happiness as a problem. It is a risk I am willing to take. If this book kills joy, then it does what it says we should do. To kill joy, as many of the texts I cite in the following pages teach us, is to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance. My aim in this book is to make room. 

Facilitating criticism of academic spaces is key to destroying their communicative hegemony. The affirmative is an action of opening a space for those marginalized in the institution to create friction against the academy become oppositional to oppressive spaces. 

Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American & Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 198-199, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629)

Is solidarity possible? Is a shift in the center possible? A shift within the center is a direct challenge to the current hegemonic order. This shift not only challenges the top-down hierarchical order and replaces it with a more horizontal order, but it also allows us to realize and recognize that culture is shared and the unquestioned center should be contested. With this in mind, then, a critical examination of power can ensue. It also raises an important question: Is a White supremacist patriarchal hegemonic institution interested in ‘‘re-articulating?’’ In light of the oppression against women and ethnic minorities, will the institution throw off the cloak of complicity in which the hegemonic order is invested? When struggle, perseverance, and enlightenment is no longer made on the backs of women and non-White bodies perhaps that will mean other standpoints have been or can be embraced. Just as an aspect of feminist standpoint theory ‘‘seeks to expose both acts of oppression and acts of resistance by asking disenfranchised persons to describe and discuss their experiences with hope that their knowledge will reveal otherwise unexposed aspects of the social order’’ (B. J. Allen et al.1999, p. 409), the theory of articulation can be used in the same manner. The theory of articulation links and examines issues of disenfranchisement, as they are interdependent with the hegemony, language, and action that articulated their subject positions. To establish a woman’s and ethnic minority woman’s standpoint is to prepare to challenge academic hegemony. However, as Flores and Moon (2002) correctly pointed out, ‘‘so long as desires are imbued with notions of superiority and domination, attempts to destabilize race [and other marginalizations] will fail’’ (p. 200). Articulation challenges hegemony through an oppositional gaze. Giroux (1993) noted that ‘‘oppositional paradigms provide new languages through which it becomes possible to deconstruct and challenge dominant relations of power and knowledge legitimated in traditional forms of discourse’’ (p. 167). Oppositional paradigms create the possibility for rearticulation to occur, thus shifting the current hegemonic order. The issue of racism and sexism in academe gains heightened importance particularly as positionality of the outsider-within not only remains entrenched, but also continues to produce and present numerous challenges and consequences. We need to recognize that alternative representations are necessary. Just as McLaren (1995) stated that pedagogical practice must be reimagined, so too must academe be reimaged in terms of racism and sexism lest we complicitly choose to remain adrift in the reproduction of dominant ideology. We must begin to produce new ways of thinking that involve deconstructing and dismantling the current hegemonic order and beginning to rebuild, reconstruct, and rearticulate the academy in inclusive and transformative ways. We are at a critical juncture in academe. The possibilities for re-imagining and re-articulating a radically different institution come both from the disenfranchised and from the centered. It is through their standpoints, language, action, and oppositional gaze that we can enable ourselves to challenge the current constructions of racism and sexism in academe in order to embrace a critical, transformative, and liberated vision. Academia can be both enlightening and oppressive. It is not enough to have the disenfranchised included in such way as to make their contributions, their voices, and their perspectives ineffective and silenced because of the maintenance of hegemony or allow them to border-cross when it benefits those in the center. Of all places, academia should be a profession that is a marketplace for the exchange of diverse ideas, diverse perspectives, and education in the value of difference.

The 1AC is a refusal to have our words coopted and silenced inside of institutions. Only by calling attention to the violence inside of the institution can we ever recognize the walls we need to come up against & carve out our survival strategy.

Nguyen 14 Nicole Nguyen and R. Tina Catania The Feminist Wire August 5 2014 "On Feeling Depleted: Naming, Confronting, and Surviving Oppression in the Academy" thefeministwire.com/2014/08/feeling-depleted-naming-confronting-surviving-oppression-academy/

We write because we cannot remain silent. And the “we” that we envision is more than our own impulses. It is a collective we that cannot be and will not be silent in the face of oppression. As Audre Lorde writes, “Your silence will not protect you.” The silence[7] of individuals who are “waiting to get a job” or “waiting to get tenure” or “keeping their heads down and doing their own thing” does not protect them from microaggressions, from oppression, from depletion.[8] What it does do is continue to reify and entrench the oppressive nature of the academy; it disciplines us to stay silent, to reinforce oppression, and to participate in its reproduction. Thus, we urge every-body, but especially those in positions of power (i.e., tenure-track and tenured faculty) to name oppression. To name sexism. To name ableism. To name racism. To be cognizant of how these -isms intersect to violently oppress and privilege particular bodies and identities. We must name instances, call attention to the ways that the academy’s daily practices are multiply oppressive. And we should do so whether we experience them through someone like Stuart, a prototypical, privileged, white male, or through anyone else whether white feminists, able-bodied people of color, or male “allies.” These violences, from whomever they come and through whatever structures make such encounters possible, must be named. They must be resisted. And they must be transformed. We recognize that, as Sara Ahmed warns, “exposing a problem is to become a problem.”[9] Yet, we refuse to be disciplined. We refuse to have our words, actions, and experiences foreclosed for fear of being read as the “problem,” always “stirring up trouble.” the fear that the discipline, field, department, administration, university, society tries to instill in us so that we do not speak up, so that we do not name our oppressions. We recognize the academic institution and its practices for what they are: inherently oppressive. We recognize that many have no desire to critique the academy because they do not want to jeopardize their privilege within it. We recognize that critiques of academia are necessarily limited by those who make them when they are invested in maintaining its structure, a structure that works for them. We seek to radically reshape and remake the institution in more equitable ways. True solidarity cannot pay lip service to feminist, de-colonial, anti-racist projects while maintaining individual investments in a system that works for only the most privileged bodies. Marginalized individuals cannot but participate in the oppression of other marginalized people if they are invested in academia’s current structure. Increased “representation” merely reifies the system rather than expands the possibilities for solidarity, for change. We see our colleagues, our cohorts, our faculty, our peers, and even ourselves as colluding in these oppressions when they (we) ignore them, when they ignore us, when they remain silent at their occurrence, when they are oblivious to their daily repetition. When your colleague does not plan an accessible, inclusive event from the beginning, they actively reproduce ableism and create exclusionary spaces. And our naming that problem, and therefore your collusion in ableist oppression, makes us the problem, rather than you or the institution. When the violent actions of white, male students not only go unpunished, but undiscussed and unrecognized by faculty, you actively participate in our racialized and gendered oppression. Within a deeply inequitable institution, we strive to navigate a space for ourselves, for understanding. We understand that we are a part of the academy and that our actions can also work to sustain it. Yet we strive for a different academy. We seek to transform the institution. For us, this includes naming the violences of those like Stuart and rejecting the common call to discipline ourselves into not writing or voicing radical critiques of the academy. So we begin here, with a naming of sorts. We write to name what we should not name. Yet writing also serves as a way to carve out alternative spaces. Spaces that contribute to our survivability and to our resistance against these structural and everyday forms of oppression. These spaces are where we “recognize each other, find each other, create spaces of relief, spaces that might be breathing spaces, spaces in which we can be inventive.”[10] We write together to claim our intersectional identities and recognize that for us, the academy must include the stories of our bodies, our exclusions, our resistances, our politics, our activism. We write to document our exhaustion in surviving, resisting, and reshaping this deeply violent institution even as we, as graduate students, occupy particularly precarious positions. Given these oppressions in the academy, this is a call for different, transnational, cross-border, and accessible forms of solidarity. We write, ultimately, as an invitation to those other depleted-yet-vibrant bodies, bodies who imagine another kind of academy. An academy that is collaborative, feminist, and inclusive. It is an invitation to strategize, to survive, to heal.